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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the case 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Craig Mecham and John Hedman brought suit against 
Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson, his wife, to re-
cover $3,275.42, plus costs and interest for breach 
of contract. Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson counter-
claimed against Craig Mecham and John Hedman for fraud-
ulently selling them the mobile home which was represented 
to be: 
a. new when it was used; 
b. it was represented never to have been wrecked, 
when in truth and in fact, it had been wrecked in that 
the mobile home had been blown over in a wind storm; 
c. that the mobile home was rampant with latent 
defects; 
d. in addition thereto, the contract had been 
unlawfully filled in, and the Bensons were fraudulently 
charged a $32,137.12 finance charge which resulted 
in the Bensons pay $60,497.12 for a $27,000.00 mobile 
home on which the unpaid balance was $19,600.00. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Case was tried before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Judge, sitting with~ Jury. The 
d . t · favor of the Jury unanimously rendered a ver 1c in 
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defendants and against the plaintiffs as follows: 
a. No cause of action on plaintiffs' Complaint. 
b. And a verdict of: 
"We, the jurors impaneled in the above-entitled 
case find on defendants' Counterclaim, the issues 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, 
and award the following damages: compensatory damages, 
$7,400.00; punitive damages, $000.00; attorney fees 
~1,680.00. ' 
c. Plaintiffs' Motion for a new trial was sub-
sequently denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson seek to have 
the Jury verdict affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In view of the fact that plaintiffs' Statement 
of Facts is not completely correct, Myron L. Benson 
and Ellen Benson, his wife, deem it helpful to restate 
the facts. 
On the 29th day of October, 1975, the plaintiffs 
did come to Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson, his wife, 
and represent that they had for sale a ~ 1974 Silver-
crest Chalet mobile home, serial number WS-747-X4, 
and that they would sell the mobile home to the Bensons 
for the sum of $27,000.00. Mecham and Hedman did 
represent to the Bensons that the mobile home was a 
new home; that said mobile home had never been wrecked 
or blown over, when in truth and in fact, it had been 
wrecked and it had been blown over. It was further 
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represented by Mecham and Hedman that upon the Bensons 
paying a cash down payment of $7,400.00, that the 
unpaid balance of ~19,600.00 would be financed at the 
rate of eight and one-half per cent (8!%). That 
Craig Mecham did unlawfully and fraudulently change 
the interest rate and fill in the contract a rate 
which was not agreed upon, to-wit: an add-on rate of 
thirteen and six-tenths per cent (13.6%) (TR-266), 
that this unauthorized interest rate resulted in the 
Bensons being charged $60,197.12 for a $27,000.00 
mobile home which at the closing of the contract only 
had an unpaid cash balance price of $19,600.00 (TR-266) 
( TR-305). 
In addition to the foregoing fraudulent acts, 
the Bensons allegeq in their Counterclaim, and further 
alleged that the mobile home was full of latent defects 
by reason of it having been wrecked in a wind storm 
(TR-313). These defects included the following proven 
facts: 
a. the mobile home could not be leveled (TR-306); 
b. the roof leaked (TR-306); 
c. the appliances were defective (TR-306); 
d. the wall subsequently cracked (TR-327); 
e. the cabinets were not square (TR-326); 
f. the doors would not close (TR-327). 
That by reason of the foregoing unlawful acts 
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of fraud that had been perpetuated upon the Bensons 
by Mecham and Hedman, the Bensons did lose the equity 
in their trade in family home for which they had been 
given a down payment credit of $7,400.00. In addition 
thereto, the Bensons did further suffer damages of 
$1,680.00 for attorney fees which Mecham and Hedman 
stipulated in Open Court was fair and reasonable (the 
Jury adopted their stipulation) (TR-293). 
The installment sale and security agreement (see 
P-1) was executed by Craig Mecham, personally, and 
showed Majestic Mobile Homes as sellor. An alleged 
copy of (P-1) installment sale (see D-9) and security 
agreement was delivered to the Bensons some months 
after the sale was such that you could not read the 
finance charge (TR-267), nor the percentage rate (TR-268), 
nor could you read the number of the monthly payments 
or monthly installments (TR-268). In addition thereto, 
the payment schedule, and the deferred payment price 
were illegible. 
Plaintiffs admit and allege that Craig Mecham and 
John Hedman both sued in their personal capacity. The 
Bensons in their Counterclaim (see paragraph 8) allege: 
Majestic Homes, Inc., was the alter ego of Craig 
Mecham and John Hedman and because they operated under 
an alter ego, and beca~se they have brought a Complaint 
herein in their own name, they are estopped from assert-
ing any defense on behalf of the corporation; also that 
any Judgment that is rendered herein will be rendered 
personally against the plaintiffs, and any acts of 
Majestic Homes, Inc., are binding upon Craig Mecham and 
John Hedman, personally (TR-37). 
-4-
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Defendants generally deny paragraph 8 as aforesaid, so, 
the following Demand for Admission was submitted (TR-56): 
7. Admit or deny that Craig Mecham and John 
Hedman are both bound individually and as a corpor-
ation on the contract and agreement sued upon herein. 
ANSWER: ADMITTED (see TR-56). 
10. Admit or deny that Majestic Homes, Inc., 
has no interest whatever in the contract sued upon 
herein between plaintiffs and defendants. 
ANSWER: ADMITTED. 
The foregoing admissions are made under oath before 
a Notary Public on the 11th day of October, 1977 (TR-56). 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS CRAIG MECHAM AND JOHN HEDMAN ARE PER-
SONALLY LIABLE. 
POINT II 
MYRON L. BENSON'S AND ELLEN BENSON'S, RESPONDENT'S, 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT BARRED BY THE CONTRACTS' EXPRESS 
PROVISIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS CRAIG MECHAM AND JOHN HEDMAN ARE PER-
SONALLY LIABLE. 
Mecham and Hedman for the first time on appeal 
assert as their first point in argument that: 
"They are not liable for claim brought against 
them as agents of Majestic Homes, Inc." 
This assertion is shocking in that during sixteen 
months of litigation; 223 pages of Court pleadings 
Of trl.al by Jury which included and documents; two days 
133 pages of evidence. Mecham and Hedman have always 
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maintained that they are the real parties in interest 
and that they are both bound individually on the contract 
and agreement sued upon herein (TR-56). 
Craig Mecham and John Hedman commenced this action 
via a Complaint and Summons filed March 3, 1977, in 
which they personally, as plaintiffs, allege: 
a. (see paragraph 2) (TR-2) That defendants on 
or about the 29th day of October, 1975, entered into 
a contract with plaintiffs for the purchase of a 
* * * new 1974 Silvercrest Chalet mobile home * * * 
b. (see also paragraph 4) (TR-2) That the plain-
tiffs in accordance with their rights and duties under 
said contract * * * 
On April 20, 1977, an Amended Complaint was filed 
(TR-8) in which the above allegations were again set 
forth re-affirming the fact that Mecham and Hedman 
were the real parties in interest. 
Defendants both in their Counterclaim and in their 
Answer alleged that Mecham and Hedman were personally 
liable (TR-37) (TR-50). The issue was squarely put 
before the Court. 
The issue was settled once and for all on October 11, 
1977, when Craig Mecham and John Hedman under oath 
made the following admission (TR-56): 
7. Admit or deny that Craig Mecham and John 
Hedman are both bound individually and as a corporation 
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on the contract and agreement sued upon herein 
ANSWER: ADMITTED. . 
10. Admit or deny that Majestic Mobile Homes 
Incorporated, has no interest whatsoever in the co~­
tract sued upon herein between the plaintiffs and 
defendants. 
ANSWER: ADMITTED (TR-56). 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
CRAIG MECHAM, and JOHN HEDMAN, being first duly 
sworn on oath deposes and says: That he is the Plaintiff 
in the above entitled action. That he has read and 
executed the foreoing answers and that he knows the 
contents therein to be true to the best of his knowlege 
and belief. 
/s/ CRAIG W. MECHAM 
/s/ JOHN S. HEDMAN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11th day 
of October, 1977. 
My Commission Expires: 
March 26, 1980 
/s/ SHIRELY J. MITCHELL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Salt 
Lake City 
All pleadings; all interrogatories; and all admissions 
represented that Mecham and Hedman had sued personally 
and were personally liable. As late as November 30, 
1977, plaintiffs represented to the Court in a brief 
in support of a Summary Judgment the following undisputed 
Facts ( TR-69) : 
1. On October 16, 1975, defendants entered into 
an agreement with plaintiffs * * * copy of which is 
annexed hereto. 
2. At that time, plaintiffs were doing business 
as Majestic Mobile Homes, Incorporated, now a defunct 
Utah Corporation. 
3. October 29, 1975--Defendants entered into 
the contract for sale with plaintiffs entitled install-
ment sale and security agreement--annexed hereto--
WHEREBY PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO SELL AND DEFENDANTS AGREED. 
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TO BUY THE AFORESAID MOBILE HOME. 
Plaintiffs (TR-70) then set forth: Issues to 
be resolved!! 
Ten issues are set forth--none of which included 
or mentioned plaintiffs' Point I, to-wit: 
"Appellants are not liable for claims brought 
against them as agents of Majestic Homes, Inc." 
Plaintiffs throughout have claimed all the benefits 
of the Contract, including attorney fees (P-1) (also 
see TR-145, TR-67 to and including TR-70), in which 
Steven F. Alder, plaintiffs' attorney testified, stipu-
lated, and agreed that under the contract, Mecham and 
Hedman were entitled to $1,680.00 should they prevail. 
THE COURT: Let me explain the significance of 
that stipulation. Ladies and Gentlemen, that means 
that the parties have agreed between them that on 
the issue of attorney fees the sum of sixteen hundred 
and eighty dollars is a reasonable fee to be awarded 
the prevailing party in this matter (TR-293). 
(P-1) was signed by Craig Mecham personally. 
No corporation was mentioned therein. In accordance 
with Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs 
and their attorney, by their Complaint and subsequent 
pleadings, represented to the Court that Craig Mecham 
and John Hedman were the real parties in interest. 
It has long been the rule of this Court: "That 
a matter not raised at the trial Court could not be 
raised on appeal." See Edgar v. Wagner 572 Pac. 2nd 405; 
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see also First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Utah 
State University 544 P. 2nd 887 which involved a similar 
situation this Court citing Davis v. Mulholland 
25 Utah 2nd 56; 475 P. 2nd 834 (1970) held: "Ordinarily 
an appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for the 
first time different from that presented to the Court 
below." See also 5 Am. Jur. 2nd appeal and error 
Sec. 546; Pettingill v. Perkins 2 Utah 2nd 26; 272 P. 
2nd 185. 
Plaintiffs sued personally. The case was tried 
by plaintiffs on the theory that they were bound in-
dividually and as a corporation by virtue of the con-
tract (P-1) sued upon herein. Having by their own 
pleadings, evidence and instructions tried and rested 
the case on the theory that Mecham and Hedman are the 
real parties in interest; they are personally liable 
and bound by their own theory. Plaintiffs cannot on 
appeal shift their theory and position. See Pettingill 
v. Perkins, supra 2 Utah 2nd 266-269. 
POINT II 
MYRON L. BENSON'S AND ELLEN BENSON'S, RESPONDENT'S, 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT BARRED BY THE CONTRACTS' EXPRESS 
PROVISIONS. 
As a matter of law, respondents' Counterclaim was 
not barred by the contracts' express provisions and 
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and by failure to give notice of rejection. 
On September 8, 1977, the Bensons filed a Counter-
claim alleging: 
a. Fraudulent alteration of contract with regard 
to interest rates, finance charge; number of monthly 
installments; deferred payment price. 
b. Fraudulent misrepresentations: 
1. That mobile home was ~ when plaintiffs knew 
it had been used as a demonstrator. 
2. That mobile home had not been wrecked when 
in truth and in fact it had been blown over and wrecked 
in a wind storm (TR-313). 
3. Home could not be leveled. 
4. Doors were not squared; roof leaked; appliances 
were defective; appliances were not new, but were used. 
5. Walls cracked; cabinets were not square (TR-40). 
After proper motion and hearing the Counterclaim was 
ordered filed by the Court (TR-52). 
Plaintiffs Craig Mecham and John Hedman replied 
to Counterclaim as follows: 
1. Admits paragraph one (residency). 
2. Denies paragraphs two through eight. 
Thus the issues were framed. On proper trial and 
after proper instructions were given, the matter was 
submitted to a Jury. The Jury found the issues in 
-10-
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favor of defendants on their Counterclaim. 
Now for the first time on appeal, plaintiffs 
claim that Counterclaim was barred by express pro-
visions of the contract by failure of respondents to 
give notice of rejection. 
The Bensons' Counterclaim was ordered filed by 
the Court. Plaintiffs, generally denied all allega-
tions with the exception of residency. Defendants' 
specific allegations of fraud were put in issue. 
Plaintiffs, for the first time since the filing of 
the action, have now attempted to assert a new issue 
of rejection. This issue was never mentioned at the 
trial. The plaintiffs offered no instructions to the 
Court on this issue, and although the plaintiffs men-
tion it in their' Second Point, they cite no cases nor 
any facts in support thereof. 
In regard to plaintiffs' allegation that the 
Complaint was barred by the express provisions of the 
contract, the Court's attention is called to the fact 
that the issue of fraud was pled with particularity, 
proven by clear and convincing evidence submitted to 
the Jury on proper instructions. After weighing the 
evidence, the Jury found that the Bensons' allegations 
of fraud were proven by clear and convincing evidence, 
and rendered a verdict accordingly. The only real 
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disputed fact that was placed before the Jury was 
whether or not the plaintiffs gave the defendants a 
Xerox copy of plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The defendants 
testified that the only contract that they received 
was defendants' Exhibit 9. A cursory comparison of 
(P-1) and (D-9) will indicate that the Jury's verdict 
was correct in that (D-9) substantiates defendants' 
position that the finance charge; annual percentage 
rate; payment schedule; and deferred payment price 
were absent from defendants' copy of the contract. 
The evidence clearly shows that (D-9) was not deliv-
ered to the defendants for some months after the sale 
was completed by reason of the fact that all contracts 
were sent to the bank and the bank mailed defendants' 
copy (D-9) to them with the payment book. Defendants 
honestly believed that the original contract had been 
filled in properly at the proper rate of interest, 
and upon learning that they were being charged 13.6% 
instead of the agreed Si%, promptly repudiated the 
contract. Craig Mecham acknowledged on cross-examin-
ation that the add-on rate of 13.6% was different than 
the Si% which had been represented to the defendants 
(TR-266) (TR-305). 
The other issues of fraud properly submitted and 
resolved by the Jury and complained of in plaintiffs' 
brief were as follows: Craig Mecham, on cross-exam-
ination, denied that the mobile home had ever been 
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-blown over and wrecked. Howard Maki, a security guard 
of Mr. Hedman and Mr. Mecham, testified that when 
they brought in the mobile home in thre~ (3) sections, 
the wind blew the middle section over (TR-311). The 
testimony of the security guard was never rebutted 
or questioned. The evidence is clear that the mobile 
home was then repaired and sold to the Bensons as a 
new home (see P-1, top left-hand corner, where in Craig 
Mecham's handwriting "new" was written in, on the 29th 
of October, 1975). In view of this testimony, the 
Bensons testimony, that the house could not be leveled; 
the cabinets were crooked; that the roof leaked; that 
the walls and doors could not be squared, certainly 
amounted to clear and convincing evidence upon which 
the Jury could fact their verdict. 
Defendants did not deny that they inspected the 
mobile home prior to purchasing it. In this regard, 
plaintiffs admit that the mobile home had been set 
up, prepared, and placed on the lot for sale. In 
light of this, it could be reasonably assumed that the 
defects were covered over and patched up and concealed 
so that a reasonable prudent person could not and 
would not see them on a reasonable inspection. It 
wasn't until after the home was bought and after several 
attempts to level the mobile home and correct certain 
items, that the defects came to light. This evidence 
was presented to the Jury, and the Jury found by clear 
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and convincing facts that the Bensons had been de-
frauded. 
The defendants', the Bensons', Counterclaim was 
stated with reasonable certainty and clarity, the 
plaintiffs had ample notice of what they were obligated 
to meet. The issue was actually tried in all respect 
under these facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs 
should be precluded from complaining about it. 
The plaintiffs, for the first time on appeal, 
allege in their brief that Section 70A-2-606 (1 UCA) 
and Section 70A-2-607 (C) as a matter of law, barred 
defendants' Counterclaim. Although this matter was 
argued on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(which was denied), the issue was never presented to 
the trial Court; nor mentioned during the trial; 
nor was any such defense asserted upon conclusion of 
the evidence--when PLAINTIFFS MADE THEIR MOTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. (see TR-348). 
The Court's attention is also called to the 
fact that when plaintiffs submitted to the Court, their 
instructions, numbered 1 through 9 (TR-143 to TR-152), 
not one requested instruction was requested concerning 
the defense of reasonable notice of rejection. Nor 
did the plaintiffs, throughout the entire trial ever 
assert the defense of sellors warranties, which was 
concealed on the reverse side of the contract (see 
-14-
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reverse side of D-9). At this late date, the plaintiffs, 
now on page 6 of their brief, now seek to assert this 
defense. With regard to the provisions concerning 
warranties on the reverse side of the contract, plain-
tiffs now claim that this concealed provision barred 
the defendants' right to recover on their Counter-
claim. Concerning this late defense, the Court's 
attention is called to the established law of this state. 
As is set down in Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
557 Pac. 2nd 1009, in which this Court stated: 
"SECTION 70A-2-316, UCA 1953, REQUIRES THAT TO 
EXCLUDE AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, A 
DISCLAIMER MUST BE CONSPICUOUS, I.E. IN LARGER OR CON-
TRASTING TYPE OR COLOR. THE REASON FOR THIS PROVISION 
IS THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF THE LAW TO LOOK WITH 
DISFAVO~UPON SEMI-CONCEALED OR OBSTRUCTED SELF-PRO-
TECTED PROVISIONS OF A CONTRACT, PREPARED BY ONE PARTY 
TO WHICH THE OTHER PARTY IS NOT LIKELY TO NOTICE. 
WE THINK IT IS A CORRECTIVE SALUTARY RULE, THAT WHERE 
THERE ARE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHARACTER IN A CONTRACT, 
EITHER BURIED IN OTHER PROVISIONS, IN FINE PRINT OR 
OTHERWISE SEKI-CONCEALED, OR SECRETED IN SOME MANNER, 
SUCH AS BEING FOUND ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE BACK 
SIDE OF THE DOCUMENT. THEY SHOULD NOT BE BINDING 
UPON THE SIGNER (BUYER), UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE 
PROVISION WAS ACTUALLY CALLED TO HIS ATTENTION." 
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The Court will note that the installment sale and 
security agreement, on its face, makes no reference 
to merchantability. The actual disclaimer is placed 
on the back among other fine print provisions (see 
D-9). 
Under the law and doctrine set forth and prescribed 
in Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, supra, Craig 
Mecham and John Hedman should not be permitted to in-
sist that this concealed provision be effective as 
a waiver (see also Seal v. TAYCO, Inc., 16 Utah 2nd 323, 
400 Pac. 2nd 503). 
Although Section 70A-2-607 (3A, UCA 1953) was nei-
ther presented, argued, or asserted during the trial 
or in plaintiffs' Motion for Directed Verdict, the 
plaintiffs now seek to urge this defense on appeal. 
In this regard, the Court's attention is called to 
Craig Mecham's testimony (TR-262), in which he admitted 
that he guaranteed and warranted the home to be fit 
for the purpose for which it was sold. He also told 
them that it was a nice, beautiful, livable home, and 
that if they had any problems with it, he would fix 
them, maintain them, and take care of them. It was 
further admitted that several attempts were made to 
patch up the defects. As was previuosly stated, the 
contract (D-9) was not mailed out to the Bensons for 
several months, this coupled with the fact that they 
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(the Bensons) firmly believed they were doing business 
with respectable, honest people, and it was not until 
they obtained a copy of (P-1) from the State Tax Commis-
sion that they became aware of the fact that the inter-
est rates had been changed; and upon further learning 
that the house had been wrecked and blown over in a 
wind storm and was incapable of being repaired; that the 
Bensons promptly brought suit herein. There was no 
_showing at the trial by the plaintiffs that the Bensons 
failed to act within a reasonable time. On the contrary, 
the plaintiffs, in their brief, failed to analyze the 
evidence in the light favorable to plaintiffs' conten-
tion, as it should be by reason of the Jury verdict. 
In Christopher v. Larson for Sales, supra, this Court 
stated that what constituted a reasonable time for 
return and request for recision under the statute, 
quoted above, it is usually a question of fact to be 
determined from the circumstances in each case; and 
a finding thereon is subject to the standard rule of 
review which will not be upset if there is a reason-
able basis in the evidence to sustain it. 
The plaintiffs tendered no instructions, no inter-
rogatories, nor did they at any time throughout the 
trial claim that the Bensons failed to act within a 
reasonable time. On the contrary, the evidence shows 
that the defendants' delays were the result of the 
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plaintiffs' failure to deliver to them a readable con-
tract and their further attempts to patch up a wind-
blmm. mobile home that was rampant with latent defects 
(see instruction 13) (TR-166). 
CONCLUSION 
The above-entitled cause was tried and submitted 
to the jury on the basis of a written contract, for 
and on behalf of the plaintiff, and on the basis of 
fraud, by reason of the Counterclaim of the defendant. 
These issues were submitted to the jury after the 
Court had instructed the Jury on each and all of the 
necessary elements of fraud, and more particularly: 
The defendants' requirement of proving fraud by clear 
and convincing evidence. The Jury accepted the defen-
dants' version and found that the representations 
were material to the transaction, and that they were 
false and fraudulent as to the defendants. The defen-
dants respectfully urge the Court to sustain Jury's 
verdict in that it is amply supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~ffeD~ 
and Respondents 
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